Abstract-Biometric systems present some important advantages over the traditional knowledge-or possess-oriented identification systems, such as a guarantee of authenticity and convenience. However, due to their widespread usage in our society and despite the difficulty in attacking them, nowadays criminals are already developing techniques to simulate physical, physiological and behavioral traits of valid users, the so-called spoofing attacks. In this sense, new countermeasures must be developed and integrated with the traditional biometric systems to prevent such frauds. In this work, we present a novel robust and efficient approach to detect spoofing attacks in biometric systems (fingerprint-based ones) using a deep learning-based model: the Deep Boltzmann Machine (DBM). By extracting and working with high-level features from the original data, DBM can deal with complex patterns and work with features that can not be easily forged. The results show the proposed approach outperforms other state-of-the-art techniques, presenting high accuracy in terms of attack detection and allowing working with less labeled data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identification is one of the most important tasks performed in human society. With the proliferation of the computer systems in the last decades, knowledge-and possess-based automatic identification methods became the most common alternatives for people recognition due to their simplicity, low computational cost and speed. However, these kind of automatic identification approaches present many drawbacks: the passwords can be forgotten, discovered by thirds, shared without the owner's consent, cards and keys can be lost (or left, eventually, in another place), stolen and damaged. To deal with such problems, Biometrics emerged and has been increasingly associated with the automatic people recognition based on their physical, physiological or behavioral traits [1] , [2] .
Biometric systems present some important advantages over the traditional knowledge-or possess-based identification methods, such as guaranteed authenticity, convenience, nonrepudiation, etc. However, due to their widespread and despite the difficulty to attack them, nowadays criminals are already developing sophisticated techniques to simulate traits of valid users (spoofing attacks). In this sense, countermeasures, i.e., spoofing detection techniques, should be developed and integrated with the traditional biometric systems to prevent such frauds [3] . Simple countermeasure methods use basic information extracted by the sensors to detect whether there is a live or fake biometric trait being presented. However, these methods based exclusively on simple rules (presence of facial movement, e.g.) are shown to be not good enough.
In this work, we present a novel approach to detect spoofing attacks in biometric systems, most specifically, in fingerprintbased ones, based on a deep learning technique: the Deep Boltzmann Machine (DBM) [4] . DBMs have been increasingly used in difficult tasks due to their capacity to deal with complex patterns in an efficient and accurate way. Since they extract and work with high-level features from the original data, these methods are suitable for tasks where the patterns in the database should not be easily or trivially detected or forged. The results show the proposed approach outperforms other state-of-the-art techniques, presenting high accuracy in terms of attack detection rates. Besides, the DBM-based architectures can be trained even when there are few labeled samples (semi-supervised learning), an advantage over other traditional machine learning algorithms.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, basic concepts of spoofing attacks and countermeasure methods are presented, as well as the basic principles of the Restricted Boltzmann Machine-based deep learning model used in the proposed approach to prevent such frauds.
A. Biometric Spoofing Detection
According to Ratha, Connell and Bolle [5] , there are many ways to attack a biometric system, i.e., there are different points of the system that can be explored by criminals during an attempt of fraud. In short, the attacks can be divided into two groups: direct and indirect attacks.
In the direct attacks, criminals generate synthetic samples of biometric characteristics of legal users, such as photographs (face simulation), gelatin fingers (fingerprint simulation), contact lenses (iris simulation), among others, to obtain access to places, or systems. Criminals try to fool the capture sensor with such samples, the most vulnerable point of the biometric recognition system. These attacks are called spoofing [6] . In the indirect attacks, criminals, after investigating the inner working of the system and based on some fragility detected, act by modifying the algorithms used to match templates or internal messages exchanged by the system modules [5] .
It is important to know, however, that the great majority of attacks to biometric systems are in the direct mode. The advantage of direct attacks to criminals is that it is not necessary to know how the system works (its feature extraction algorithm, matching modules, classifiers, database structure, etc.). It is not necessary either to have any skills in Computer Science [5] , [7] . Fig. 1 shows eight points of possible attacks in a biometric system. The highlighted point (in red) corresponds to the direct attacks (presentation of fake traits to the sensor). Fig. 1 . Points of attack in a traditional biometric system. As explained, the spoofing attacks occur in point "1", i.e., by fooling the sensor (presentation of fake traits) [7] .
As briefly mentioned, examples of spoofing attacks, in the context of facial recognition systems, are the use of photographs, videos and even three-dimensional facial masks of valid users for access authorization purposes [6] , [3] . In the case of iris, attackers are used to print images or even contact lenses to cheat the sensors [8] . In recognition through fingerprints, the most common attacks consist of using artificial replica, molded with silicone, gelatin or latex, of the fingers of legal users (even reproductions of latent fingerprints left on smooth surfaces) [9] .
In order to detect attacks like these, a number of antispoofing methods have been developed based on different principles and techniques. However, despite of the progress, the prevention of such frauds is still an open question [6] . In summary, there are four categories of antispoofing methods: (i) data-oriented methods; (ii) methods that model the user behavior; (iii) methods that require interaction; and (iv) methods that make use of additional sensors [6] , [10] .
The data-driven methods can be considered the most suitable ones in many cases, since they do not require any additional sensor, especial or new user behavior, or even changes in the core of the traditional biometric system. They generally work extracting additional information of the biometric characteristic under analysis for the recognition process. Such additional information (features) are then presented to a classifier, which operates, given an attempt of access to the biometric system, labeling it as attack or not.
The main problem of most of the existent spoofing detection data-driven methods is that they are based on simple rules (simple features) in order to classify an activity as an attack or not, e.g., presence of eyes' movement, in the case of face recognition systems. However, in these cases, criminals can easily identify these rules used by the systems to detect attacks and improve (adapt) their techniques: they can just cut the eyes' regions of the photograph of a valid user and place their own eyes in the holes, simulating the eyes' movements expected by the spoofing detection module.
In this sense, algorithms able to work with abstract, highlevel and non trivially generated features from original inputs from the sensors become extremely necessary. Among them, a branch of machine learning algorithms has obtained considerable attention from the global research and commercial society: the deep learning-based methods. Simulating the deep structures of neurons present in the human brain and the way they learn, these methods outperformed state-of-the-art techniques in many areas and tasks. Among the recently proposed deep learning methods are the algorithms based on the Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM) [11] , [12] , being one of them the Deep Boltzmann Machine (DBM) [4] , which is used in this work to detect the attack patterns, and consists in a stack of layers composed of RBMs that learns in a smarter and more efficient way than standard RBMs.
B. Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM)
Restricted Boltzmann Machines [11] , [12] are energy-based stochastic neural networks composed of two layers of neurons (visible and hidden), in which the learning phase is conducted by means of an unsupervised fashion. The RBM, actually, is based on the classical Boltzmann Machines [13] with the restriction that no connections between neurons of the same layer are allowed. This restriction allows training in a significantly lower complex way with no high costs in terms of performance.
A naïve architecture of a Restricted Boltzmann Machine ( Fig. 2 ) comprises a visible layer v with m units and a hidden layer h with n units. Additionally, a real-valued matrix W m×n models the weights between the visible and hidden neurons, where w ij stands for the weight between the visible unit v i and the hidden unit h j . [11] , [12] . Each neuron of a given layer is connected with all the neurons in the opposite layer. No intralayer connection is allowed.
At first, let us assume both v and h as being binaryvalued units. In other words, v ∈ {0, 1} m e h ∈ {0, 1} n , thus leading to the so-called Bernoulli-Bernoulli Restricted Boltzmann Machine (BB-RBM), since both kind of units follow a Bernoulli distribution. The energy function of a BB-RBM is given by:
where a and b stand for the biases of visible and hidden units, respectively.
The probability of a joint configuration (v, h) is computed as follows:
where Z stands for the so-called partition function, which is basically a normalization factor computed over all possible configurations involving the visible and hidden units. Similarly, the marginal probability of a visible (input) vector is given by:
Since the BB-RBM is a bipartite graph, the activations of both visible and hidden units are mutually independent, thus leading to the following conditional probabilities:
and
where:
Note that φ(·) stands for the sigmoid function. Let θ = (W, a, b) be the set of parameters of a BB-RBM, which can be learned though a training algorithm that aims at maximizing the product of probabilities given all the available training data V, as follows:
One of the most used approaches to solve the above problem is the Contrastive Divergence (CD) [14] , which basically ends up performing Gibbs sampling using the training data as the visible units.
In the presence of real-valued data, one should use the socalled Gaussian-Bernoulli RBMs (GB-RBM) [15] , which now model the input vector as being composed of Gaussian units. Therefore, Eq. 1 can be reformulated as follows:
Since the visible units have been modified, one needs to reformulate their conditional probability. Therefore, Eq. 6 can be rewritten as follows:
where σ 2 stands for the variance of the Gaussian distribution N (noise-free reconstruction).
C. Deep Belief Networks (DBN)
RBMs [11] , [12] can be used for many tasks, such as reconstruction of a given input vector corrupted with noise, for instance (eliminating the undesired information). However, in order to learn more complex and internal representations of the data, a deep architecture is required. Therefore, DBNs (Deep Belief Nets) [16] were proposed, which are a precursor of the Deep Boltzmann Machines (DBM) used in this work.
Basically, a DBN consists of a stack of RBMs (each layer of the DBN is composed of an RBM) [16] . In general, its training is performed layer by layer from bottom to top considering the hidden layer of the previous trained RBM as the visible layer of the above one. After finding the values for the weight and biases concerning all layers of the DBN in this bottom-up greedy approach, the network can also be used to eliminate noise, inpainting or even to extract high-level features (based on the hidden layer of the top RBM) much more accurate than a single RBM. This occurs because each RBM in the stack are untied from each other, and the isolated training process generates complementary posteriors over the input data, that guarantees the increase of the variational lower bound calculated over the data, as shown in [16] , and consequently all the generative model tends to be improved. Fig. 3 shows a graphical example of a DBN structure.
D. Deep Boltzmann Machines (DBM)
The DBM network, developed by Salakhutdinov and Hinton [4] , aims at improving the inference during the learning process of the DBN. As a consequence, one can improve the feature extraction process and deal more robustly with ambiguous inputs. In DBMs, connections among adjacent layers form a complete undirected model: the learning process considers both directions of interaction among adjacent layers, as shown in Fig. 4 . As one can observe, when analyzing a given layer of the network, its superior layer is considered as the complementary inference, its inferior layer as the initial inference, and the middle layer (layer being analyzed at the moment) as the final inference at the equilibrium stage. As an observation, differently of other supervised machine learning methods, DBMs (as well as RBMs and DBNs) can deal with less labeled data, thus do not degrading considerably their performance: in the classification task, the network can be trained in a non-supervised way, and only in a final step some labeled samples are necessary just to fine-tune the weights of an MLP (Multilayer Perceptron) classifier, which is built upon the DBM trained structure. [17] proposed the use of a variable inference method called Mean-Field (MF) to enhance the DBM learning procedure. This technique approximates the posterior distributions inferred from the observed data of the estimates based on isolated network segments. The training process of a DBM consists in minimizing the total energy of the system according to the parameters found through partial inferences made through the mean-fields [18] .
Salakhutdinov and Hinton
Roughly speaking, the idea is to find an approximation Q MF (h|v; μ) that best represents the true distribution of the hidden layers, i.e. P (h|v). This approximation is computed through the following factored distribution:
where L stands for the number of hidden layers, F l represents the number of nodes in the hidden layer l, and q(h
The goal is to find the parameters of the mean-field μ = μ 1 , μ 2 , ..., μ L according to following equations:
which represents the interaction between the visible layer and the first hidden layer. Further, the interactions between hidden layers l and l + 1 are given as follows:
where w l ij stands for the weight between node i from hidden layer l − 1 and node j from hidden layer l. Finally, the meanfield related to the top layer is computed as follows:
representing the interactions between the last two network layers.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
The proposed approach for spoofing detection uses a DBM as its main learning structure. After learning its parameters, a final layer is added at the top of such structure with two softmax units, forming an MLP (Multilayer Perceptron) network, i.e., a complete classifier to identify normal (class "0") or attack patterns (class "1"). The following subsections describe the proposed approach in terms of its training steps: (i) Image Normalization and Database Augmentation; (ii) DBM Training; and (iii) Network (MLP) Fine-Tuning.
A. Image Normalization and Database Augmentation
The first step, given an initial training set of grayscale images captured from fingerprints, consists in the application of some image processing techniques to extract their relevant regions. After that, in the normalization step, a resizing is also performed. Depending on the size of the training dataset, a database augmentation may be required to avoid lack of data when estimating the DBM's parameters.
In this work, as shown in Fig. 5 , for each training fingerprint image, its region of interest (ROI) with a fixed size (350 × 231 pixels) is cropped. After that, the ROI is resized to 44 × 29 pixels and 10 different images (patches) with size 36 × 24 are obtained from it by horizontally flipping and cropping different regions of it (corners and central ones). Such process is performed for all the training fingerprint images, and the resultant patches (in number 10 times greater than the original images) will serve as input to train the DBM.
As an observation, in order to find the ROI, each training image is binarized, and a closing operation with a squared structure of size 21×21, adequate to the database, is applied to eliminate eventual sensor's noise and to make the fingerprint a single connected region [19] . After that, in order to find the position of the fingerprint in the original image (that may vary since the users may place their fingers in different parts of the sensor area), the center of mass of the resulting binary image is calculated. Then, based on the center of mass, the 350 × 231-sized window is cropped from the original image. 
B. DBM Training
In this step, the basic idea is to: (i) train a GaussianBernoulli RBM (Eqs. 9 and 10) that serves as interface between the grayscale image values and the input probabilistic values in the first BB-RBM of the DBM; (ii) to perform a greedy bottom-up training of the DBM that serves as initialization to the Mean-Field technique; and (iii) to train the DBM using the Mean-Field algorithm. Roughly speaking, all the DBM training process consists of finding the best set of parameters of all layers of the network, Θ = {W, a, b}, by means of stochastic approximation process that compares, through the KL (Kullback-Leibler) divergence [20] , the posteriors found by the Mean-Field algorithm at the moment (Eq. 11) and the posteriors found by means of a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm, as proposed by [21] .
As aforementioned, before performing the training of the DBM itself, given each grayscale fingerprint patch, it is needed to previously train a Gaussian-Bernoulli RBM (GB-RBM), as conducted in [15] . This previous step with the GB-RBM is called GB Preprocessing, and is shown in Fig. 6 . As an observation, to facilitate the process without affecting the final results, the input data (fingerprint image patches) were normalized to have zero-mean and unitary-variance. Through the normalization, it was possible to get rid off the σ 2 term from Eq. 9 and 10 (as in [15] , it is used a noise-free reconstruction process).
After the GB Preprocessing, the DBM bottom-up initialization properly begins: each training patch is presented to the Gaussian-Bernoulli RBM and its posterior probabilities values feed the visible layer of the first BB-RBM in the DBM stack. In this process, we train the stacked Bernoulli-Bernoulli RBMs in the same way it was made in the GB Preprocessing, except by the fact that now we used a Bernoulli-Bernoulli sampling approach in the Contrastive Divergence method [14] . . Gaussian-Bernoulli Preprocessing followed by a Bernoulli-Bernoulli DBM training applied to the probability density function of a fingerprint patch of size 36 × 24 pixels.
As in [21] , after the GB Preprocessing and the bottom-up greedy initialization of the DBM, the Mean-Field algorithm is performed, updating the weights and the biases of the RBMs stacked in the DBM in a more accurate way than in the DBN model. It is important to note that, at the same time the DBM bottom-up step improves the generative model of the network, the mean-field interactions of the DBM tend to extract a higher number and more meaningfully features from the input image.
C. Fine-Tuning
After the DBM training step, an MLP neural network is constructed (Fig. 7) using the same architecture of the DBM. The initialization of the network weights is conducted using the pretrained parameters, W and b, of each individually trained RBM. We just added a new top layer with two softmax units for classification (we are working with a two-class problem, i.e., live or fake image), as follows:
where z i , with i ∈ {0; 1}, corresponds to the weighted sum (u i ) of the values provenient from the top layer of the DBM to neuron i after applying a sigmoid rectification, i.e.:
These two softmax units are responsible to convert the inputs, coming from the last above hidden layer of the DBM into some kind of normalized probabilities, making possible to compare them with the desired network outputs using the cross entropy, that measures the KL divergence [20] between the network probability distributions and the label data probability distributions. Eq. 17 shows the cross entropy cost function:
where t(v) and s(v) terms mean, respectively, the probability distribution of the target values (real label information) and the network probability distribution generated by Eq. 15. The fine tuning of the network weights is then performed (comparing desired and obtained classifications -by the softmax units -given the training fingerprint patches) using the conjugate gradient method, which makes possible to find a better configuration for the parameters W and b through gradient minimization using some line search method, as proposed by [22] , [23] .
D. Testing
After finding the most appropriate weights for the MLP based on the initial DBM, the fine-tuned model can be used for the spoofing detection task (classification of the test images in real or fake ones). This phase is much more simple than the training one and, given a fingerprint test image, consists in the following sequence of steps: 1) Patch Extraction: 10 grayscale patches (with size 36×24 pixels) are extracted from the fingerprint to be classified; This image shows the main functionalities of each layer, where it is possible to observe that there is a summation and a nonlinearization step been applied inside each node, and it is also possible to note the softmax units represented in the output layer.
2) Patch Classification: for each of the 10 patches generated, the GB-RBM (of the Preprocessing step) is fed with its grayscale information, and its outputs feed the MLP so that the forward network pass is computed. The forward pass consists in just calculating the network inner products (applying the non-linear sigmoid function) from bottom to top based on the fine-tuned parameters, propagating the results through the nodes until the softmax output layer; 3) Image Classification (Votation Scheme): given the probabilities generated by the two softmax units, for each of the 10 patches, it is possible to classify an image as belonging to a fake or live fingerprint. After classifying the 10 patches originated from the test image, the algorithm classify it as a live or fake fingerprint based on the classification of the majority of its patches (in case of draw, the fingerprint is classified as fake).
IV. EXPERIMENTS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In our experiments, concerning the preprocessing layer, we used a GB-RBM with 864 (patch of size 36 × 24) visible units and 1,000 hidden ones. Over it, we placed a DBM composed of two stacked BB-RBMs with 1,000 visible and hidden units each. At the top of DBM, there was a softmax classifier layer.
The model was trained first in a greedy-wise mode where the preprocessing layer was trained over 500 epochs and all layers of DBM (the BB-RBMs) were trained over 200 epochs from bottom to top, as mentioned in Section III, to initialize the DBM's weights. After that, 200 epochs were applied in the Mean-Field algorithm (30 iterations per epoch).
The learning rate, momentum and weight decay parameters we used to train the GB-RBM and the DBM stack followed the RBM training approach suggested in [24] . Concerning the GB-RBM, we used a learning rate of 0.001, momentum of 0.5 (and 0.9 after the fifth epoch), and weight decay of 0.0002. In the case of BB-RBMs, we used a learning rate of 0.01, the same momentum and weight decay values. The Mean-Field learning rate used was 0.0005.
All the training and fine-tuning codes were implemented in C and C++ using CUDA and the libraries BLAS [25] and OpenCV [26] . In order to accomplish this work, we used an Intel-i7 laptop with 8 cores and 8GB of RAM. The graphic hardware used was a Geforce GT650M board having 385 cores, 2 GB of dedicated memory and 2 streaming processors.
We evaluated the proposed approach over the Crossmatch database [9] from the LivDet 2013 competition of spoofing detection, which is the most challenging dataset of the competition (all assessed methods presented relatively low accuracy rates), and there are 2,250 images of fingerprints for training and 2,250 images for testing, 1,250 from live fingers and 1,000 from fake ones, in each set. The 750×800-sized images present a well defined ROI (region with fingerprint ridges) and a white background, without much noise, avoiding that segmentation errors may influence the results. The images of fake fingerprints were made of synthetic fingers using the following materials: bodydouble, playdoh, wood glue and latex (250 fake images per material). Fig. 8 shows examples of fingerprints from the Crossmatch database. As one can observe, it is a difficult task to identify which of the fingerprints were made through real fingers or synthetic ones. Fig. 8 . Fingerprints from the Crossmatch dataset [9] . The top fingerprints are real ones and the bottom are fake ones. The synthetic fingers were made, from left to right, using bodydouble, latex, playdoh and wood glue, respectively.
The results in terms of Accuracy (ACC) rate, False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) of the proposed approach and of the other state-of-the-art methods (the latter results obtained in the technical report of the international competition LivDet [9] ), are shown in Tab. I. As one can observe, the proposed DBM-based method outperformed the techniques assessed in such dataset, except for the FAR values. However, it is important to note that the methods that presented FAR of 0.00% also presented almost 100.00% of FRR, i.e., they rejected all the fingerprints, being not suitable for real situations. Fig. 9 shows the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve of the proposed method, its Equal Error Rate (EER) and Area Under Curve (AUC) -such curve is not provided in literature for the other compared techniques. As one can observe in Fig. 9 , the ROC curve of the proposed approach depicts a promising result, and also presents a low EER and AUC. The curves of the other methods were not provided by the authors. Besides, the proposed method may operate in a semi-supervised way: unlabeled samples can be used to train the DBM, initializing the weights of the posterior formed MLP in a good position of the parameter space, for further using a few labeled samples to fine-tune the MLP. This represents another advantage of the proposed method, especially if there are lots of data and no labels, a very common situation in real world.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented a novel approach for fingerprint spoofing detection based on the Deep Boltzmann Machine, a model of stochastic energy-based neural network that deal with complex patterns in an efficient way due to its probabilistic multilayer architecture. In the proposed method, after training a DBM with image patches of real and fake fingerprints, an MLP network is formed by adding a softmax layer at the top of the DBM for classification and by performing a fine tuning in the parameters of such structure (the weights of the MLP are intialized in a clever way with the DBM training algorithm). The proposed approach, which deals with high-level data given its deep learning inner working, is very robust, outperforming the state-of-the art techniques assessed on the Crossmatch dataset, the most challenging database of the LivDet 2013 spoofing detection competition. The proposed method presented a higher accuracy rate, almost 86% while other approaches presented at most 68% of accuracy in attack detection in such database, and a low ROC curve, as well as low EER and AUC values. Differently from other machine learning methods and besides the great results, the proposed approach can operate in a semi-supervised way, allowing to work with lots of unlabeled data and a few labeled samples, being very suitable for real applications.
